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State Capture from Below? 
The Contradictory Effects of Decentralisation on Public Spending 
 
Abstract 
This study analyses the contradictory effects of decentralisation on public spending. We 
distinguish three dimensions of decentralisation and analyse their joint and separate effects on 
public spending in the Swiss cantons over 20 years. We find that overall decentralisation has 
a strong, significant and negative effect on the size of the public sector, thus confirming the 
Leviathan hypothesis. The same holds for fiscal and institutional decentralisation. However, 
the extent to which political processes and actors are organised locally rather than centrally 
actually increases central and decreases local spending. This suggests that actors behave 
strategically when dealing with the centre by offloading the more costly policies. The wider 
implication of our study is that the balance between self-rule and shared rule has implications 
also for the size of the overall political system. 
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1 Introduction
1
 
What explains why some governments spend more than others? Political science, and in 
particular the public policy literature, has long sought to answer this question. The enquiry 
points to the very heart of politics given the key role of institutions for distributive, 
competitive and ideological processes such as policy-making, elections, and rivalling ideas on 
the role of the state in general (cf. Zubek and Goetz 2010). In short, political conflict often 
revolves around how much should be spent, when, and on what, to paraphrase Lasswell 
(1936). Accordingly, ever since Schmidt’s (1993, 2000) exegesis of rivalling theories 
explaining public expenditure, we can distinguish between socio-economic, partisan, power 
resources, and cultural-historical determinants, next to institutional approaches along the lines 
of Tsebelis’ (2000) veto-player theory. 
At the same time, and building on this last point about the role of institutions, various forms 
of vertical power-sharing – regionalism, decentralisation, federalism etc. – are widely 
believed to affect both the legitimacy and efficiency of policy-making (e.g. Rodden 2006; 
Treisman 2007; Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Decentralisation in particular is argued to lead 
to lower deficits (Busch 1995; Baskaran 2012), lower public spending on education, health 
care, pensions or general welfare (Busemeyer 2008; Vatter and Rüefli 2003), lower 
unemployment (Crepaz 1996), more satisfaction due to better tailored service delivery (Oates 
1972), and lower inflation rates and higher economic growth (Castles 1999; Lancaster and 
Hicks 2000). The most famous statement emanating from that literature is probably Brennan 
and Buchanan’s (1980, 216) “Leviathan hypothesis”, according to which “[t]otal government 
intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which 
                                                
1
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3 
taxes and expenditures are decentralized” (emphasis omitted). In other words, the “size of the 
public sector should vary inversely with fiscal decentralization” (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002, 16; 
also Rodden 2006, 5). 
However, “[s]urprisingly little thought has gone into defining and measuring decentralization 
and federalism in ways that facilitate empirical analysis” (Rodden 2006, 24) of exactly that 
connection. Either such measures are carefully designed – or at least skilfully combined – but 
only selected public policies are assessed (e.g. Biela et al. 2013); or output-analyses rely on a 
simplified understanding of vertical state structures (e.g. Lijphart 2012, Schmidt 1996; cf. 
also Braun 2000a, 2-4) and an operationalisation of fiscal indicators only (e.g. Rodden 
2003a). Among the notable exceptions are the studies by Schneider (2006) and O’Dwyer and 
Ziblatt (2006), who try to study the impact of different forms of decentralisation on social 
policies and the quality of government, respectively; as well as Braun (2000b), who compares 
clusters of countries distinguished by the distribution, extent and sharing of political power.
1
 
But even these studies may speak of political power only to then measure its presence, type 
and distribution using revenue, expenditure, taxes and fiscal transfer data. As we shall argue 
below, this neglects both institutions as well as politics in a more narrow sense (actors and 
processes). 
Hence, following Rodden’s (2006, 44; emphasis added) observation that “normative theories 
establishing decentralization’s promise seem to assume implicitly not only a wide range of 
local taxing and spending authority, but also some modicum of political federalism”, this 
study also includes legal and political indicators that more closely capture what is intended, 
namely the extent to which political power is distributed vertically. We will provide a three-
fold conceptualisation and measurement of decentralisation and then analyse its impact on 
government size. More particularly, we shall distinguish between an institutional (polity), a 
functional (policy), and a political dimension (politics) of decentralisation and analyse if, 
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4 
controlling for a number of other factors, decentralisation and its three dimensions matter for 
public expenditure. Taking profit of the opportunity afforded by the Swiss federation as a 
“laboratory” of 26 sub-national political systems (Braun 2003; Vatter 2002), we are able to 
compare different types and degrees of intra-cantonal decentralisation to assess their effect on 
cantonal, local, and total (cantonal plus local) spending over 20 years (1990–2009).  
We proceed by first discussing the current state of the art in both the public policy and the 
territorial politics literatures. Section three presents our research design before we explain 
government size using our own measures of decentralisation and several controls, in section 
four. Section five discusses our findings in light of the theoretical literature and concludes. 
 
2 Theory and Hypotheses 
The extent, even if not necessarily the type, of public expenditure has traditionally been 
explained from either one of five perspectives: neo-institutionalism, modernisation, path 
dependency, power resources, and party competition (Schmidt 1993, 2000). Since this study 
focuses on the effects of decentralisation, we first discuss theoretical arguments pertaining to 
that causal mechanism in particular. In doing so we distinguish three different types of 
decentralisation: functional, political, and institutional in a narrow sense. We then briefly 
discuss rivalling explanations – parties-in-government, hard-budget constraints, direct 
democracy, and non-institutional factors – as currently found in the literature. 
2.1 The impact of decentralisation 
At its most general, the impact of decentralisation (our shorthand for vertical power sharing) 
on government size is conceptualised as the effect of a specific set of “interpersonal, formal 
or informal rules and norms” (Schmidt 1993, 378; Schmidt 2000, 28) on political action (cf. 
also Hall and Taylor 1996; March and Olsen 1989; Peters 2011). This effect is commonly 
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hypothesised to operate through three causal mechanisms that all relate to different aspects of 
decentralisation: competition, local autonomy, and veto-players.  
First, competition among lower-level units in terms of taxation and service provision is 
thought to dampen the size of the overall state, since public entities would only raise and 
provide the absolute minimum of both to attract wealthy residents (Besley and Case 1995; 
Tiebout 1956, 418; Oates 1999, 1122; Alesina and Spolaore 2003, 137; Treisman 2007, 58). 
Such is the famous “Leviathan hypothesis” (Brennan and Buchanan 1980, 216), which rests 
on several assumptions, namely complete information, unhindered or at least not too costly a 
resident mobility, and individuals’ rational desires of neither wanting to pay for, nor demand 
more, than absolutely necessary (cf. Tiebout 1956, 419). 
Given that our subsequent empirical analysis uses the 26 Swiss cantons as a comparative 
template, confidence in the validity of these assumptions is higher than in a cross-national 
analysis (see also Monogan 2013 and Wasserfallen 2014). The average Swiss canton has 
310’000 inhabitants and spans 1’600 km
2
 (BFS 2015), so complete information and mobility 
are more likely. Also, moving in our case not only means staying in the same country, but 
also in the same canton, the level where several important powers are exercised (e.g. police, 
education, health and environment – so there are no costs in terms of adjusting to new 
systems by staying within the same canton) since Switzerland is one of the most federalist 
countries of the world (Füglister and Wasserfallen 2014; Linder 2012). Finally, the existence 
of fiscal equivalence in terms of a convergence of decision-makers, tax-payers and service 
recipients (Schaltegger and Feld 2003) further enhances the logic according to which “voting 
with the feet” (Tiebout 1956) indeed leads to service-provision matching tax yield.  
As the Leviathan hypothesis is concerned primarily with overall government size, it only 
makes sense to test for the effect of this aspect of decentralisation on total public spending, 
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that is both local and central spending combined (cf. Rodden 2003a, 709). Greve (2012, 7) 
equally underlines how this competitive logic of federalism would serve to “discipline 
governments” tout court. Hence, a first hypothesis reads as follows: 
H1: The more fiscally decentralised a Swiss canton, the lower its total public expenditures. 
A second argument why decentralisation would contribute to smaller government is because 
much of the overall state activity is “hidden” at lower levels, i.e. decided, financed and 
carried out by sub-system entities at their own discretion. But for decentralisation to lower 
“central decision costs” (Greve 2012, 6; emphasis added), local governments must have 
sufficient legal autonomy to actually deliver the required public services. This is an aspect 
that pertains not so much to competition or political influence but rather to “self-rule” (Elazar 
1987; Hooghe et al. 2010). 
That distinction between fiscal and legal autonomy (or between policy and polity 
decentralisation, see below) is often overlooked but has been made before. Watts (2008, 65–
66) for example distinguishes between the “the scope of jurisdiction exercised by each level 
of government, and the degree of autonomy or freedom from control by other levels of 
government with which a particular government performs the tasks assigned to it” (original 
emphasis). To determine the latter, he assesses the “formal allocation by the constitution of 
legislative powers to each level of government” as well as “the extent to which each field of 
jurisdiction is exclusively assigned to one level of government, concurrent or shared” (ibid. p. 
66). Rodden (2004, 484) equally cautions that “it is difficult to know what to make of 
expenditure decentralization data without additional data on the regulatory framework for 
subnational finance”, such as what type of taxes can be raised or how much local discretion 
there is in determining the tax base (cf. also Ebel and Yilmaz 2002, 4–5). Such rules are 
usually fixed in the constitution, although political practice and/or legal adjudication thereof 
might change over time (Gibson 2004, 2; Greve 2012, 8). The testable assumption arising 
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from this is that given local autonomy, a central government can afford to do less since lower-
level entities will both provide a safeguard for assuring a minimal service provision as well as 
act as the first entry points for citizen demands. We thus hypothesize that 
H2a: The more constitutionally decentralised a Swiss canton, the lower its central expenditures. 
A corollary from this is that through increased proximity of decision-makers to service 
beneficiaries, also the monitoring and sanctioning abilities of taxpayers are strengthened, so 
not only central but also local governments will spend less – and total government size 
decreases as in H1. However, as Rodden (2003a, 701) speculates, it might well be that vested 
interests operate even better at the local level and/or that citizens are more demanding 
precisely because of better oversight abilities (cf. also Oates 1985). In both scenarios, polity 
decentralisation would lead to more local spending. Hence, 
H2b: The more constitutionally decentralised a Swiss canton, the higher its local expenditures. 
Thirdly, there is the already mentioned political aspect of de- or rather non-centralisation. The 
argument here is that the existence of non-central loci of decision-making provides for a 
check on policy change and, through that, functions to curb excessive expenditure (Brennan 
and Buchanan 1980, 26–28; Obinger 1998, 46; Good et al. 2012, 455). As veto-players 
(Tsebelis 2000), local governments may block attempts by the centre to encroach upon their 
policy areas by centralising functions otherwise provided by them and/or through acquiring 
new powers (Vatter and Freitag 2002, 59–60; Freitag and Vatter 2008, 275; Schmidt 1998, 
223; Braun 2000b, 50–51). Schmidt (1996, 177) also provides evidence that 
“countermajoritarian constraints […] have stopped or reversed the trend towards big 
government” (cf. also Samuels and Mainwaring 2004, 86-88). But this means that to have an 
effect on policy-making, decentralisation must not only capture expenditure and revenue 
discretion (the policy dimension) or constitutional autonomy (the polity dimension), but also 
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8 
actual local political influence at higher levels (Braun 2000b, 36), i.e. the ability to block or 
initiate policy-change. 
Most often this aspect of territorial politics is captured by the notion of “shared rule”, which 
measures the extent and way in which regions co-determine national decision-making, (cf. 
Hooghe et al. 2010; Rodden 2006, 38). However, we prefer the term “political 
decentralisation” because it better conveys both the nature of central-local relations (political) 
and the direction of influence (bottom-up) (cf. also Riker 1964, 10). Thus sub-national 
governments co-determine central decision-making using different channels, for example 
through representatives in central political organs, such as elected Senators or the appointed 
delegates of Minister-Presidents (Rodden 2003b, 165). Alternatively, in the absence of upper 
chambers, non-central entities might also resort to bargaining directly with the federal 
government (Bird and Tassonyi 2003, 94), act through political parties (Riker 1964, 137ff.), 
or both (Samuels and Mainwaring 2004, 88-90). The point here is that the more powerful 
these territorial veto players, the more successfully they can object to enlarging the scope of 
public activity. Hence, a third hypothesis reads as follows: 
H3a: The more politically decentralised a Swiss canton, the lower its total expenditures. 
However, it may also happen that lower-level entities use their influence to shift public costs 
upwards and/or force the centre to take on new responsibilities, thus increasing the size of the 
central government. Rodden (2006, 5 and 41) argues along similar lines when emphasising 
central-local bargaining dynamics and possible solutions to vertical coordination problems. 
Thus “local governments, working on behalf of resident taxpayers, may shift the production 
costs of local services onto nonresidents through federally funded transfers” (Inman 2003, 36) 
that increase central spending. This very much resembles the so called “flypaper effect” 
(Rodden 2006, 78; Freitag and Vatter 2008, 276) but in an opposite direction, i.e. bottom-up 
instead of top-down. Specific examples involve the Brazilian governors “forc[ing] the central 
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government to assume their debts”, in the early 1990s (Samuels and Mainwaring 2004, 106), 
or the positive effect of legislative overrepresentation on a state’s share in federal funds in 
Argentina and Mexico (Gibson et al. 2004, 181; Diaz-Cayeros 2004, 315).  
In other words, giving non-central politicians a direct say over central policy-making will 
enable them to have the most expensive policies centralised or, in more technical terms, to 
“externaliz[e] the costs to others, turning public revenue into a ‘common pool’ that is 
overfished by provincial governments.” (Rodden 2006, 6; cf. also Freitag and Vatter 2008). 
Hence, a second hypothesis on the effect of decentralisation reads as follows: 
H3b: The more politically decentralised a Swiss canton, the higher its central expenditures. 
Details on how these three different dimensions of decentralisation are measured are provided 
in the operationalisation section, below, and in the Data Annex. Table 1 summarises our 
hypotheses. Note that, in principle, interactions between the three dimensions are very well 
imaginable, too. For example, local governments might need to posses a minimum degree of 
constitutional self-rule for shared rule to be operating efficiently. However, the point of our 
three-dimensional measurement strategy is precisely to disentangle the mere availability of 
resources from the power to decide on their use (self-rule dimension: policy and polity) as 
well as from political influence at the centre (shared rule dimension: politics). But the point 
about possible interaction effects will be taken up in the concluding section. We next turn to 
rivalling explanations. 
--- Table 1 --- 
2.2 Rivalling explanations 
There are several rivalling explanations that could explain government size better than 
decentralisation. The first is direct democracy: as an opportunity structure with relatively low 
entry costs, it offers a veto instrument of a particular kind, namely one for societal groups 
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10 
sufficiently well organised to collect the required number of signatures to initiate or block 
policy change (Wagschal and Obinger 2000, 469; also Wagschal 1997, 226). But as with 
political decentralisation above, opening up the space of political decisions to the non-elite 
(i.e. not necessarily elected politicians) and the non-political (moral, economic etc.) elite 
could lead in both directions, that is less or more public intervention than would otherwise be 
the case (Freitag et al. 2003, 355; Linder 2012, 287). It all depends on the purpose and 
strength of these organised interests (cf. also Funk & Gathmann 2011, 1258). However, 
because from the point of view of the people’s final decisions no strategic points are to be 
scored in direct-democratic votes, their vote will tend to be longer-term than that of 
politicians who want to be re-elected in a few years (cf. Eichenberger 1999). Moreover, direct 
democracy regularly practised makes for better informed citizens, raising the bar beyond 
which a majority of them is convinced that policy innovation is needed (Eichenberger 1999, 
268; Feld and Kirchgässner 2000; Kirchgässner 2000). Finally, knowing the threat of a direct-
democratic veto to exist, governments will become more cautious as regards the extent of 
change proposed, all the more so since the default option, the status quo, is always better 
known and thus inherently favoured by a generally risk-averse demos (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser 1988; Funk and Gathmann 2013).  
Another institutional variable are hard budget constraints. These refer to collectively binding 
rules on the extent of public expenditure growth and the associated risks of a bailout (Rodden 
et al. 2003, 4) and are thus institutions par excellence (Schmidt 1993, 379). Such constraints 
tie further spending to a corresponding surplus in generated revenue, a favourable debt-per-
GDP-ratio (e.g. Maastricht’s Growth and Stability Pact), and/or satisfactory economic 
performance in general. Switzerland and most of its cantons have chosen yet another way to 
ensure balanced budgets, using an instrument called “debt break” (Schuldenbremse), whereby 
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the government is authorised to run deficits during recessions and to run surpluses during 
booms. Over the whole business cycle, however, it has to ensure that the budget is balanced. 
Thus, starting with a given level of debt, the debt should not have increased after the completion 
of a full cycle. (Müller 2004, 2) 
The debt break, in other words, represents a specific kind of self-imposed budget constraint 
(cf. also Rodden et al. 2003, 23). The idea to apply this rule to Swiss policy-making dates 
back to 1919, when Canton St. Gall first introduced it into its legislation (Stalder and Röhrs 
2005, 12; Kirchgässner 2010, 8). Over the 1990s and 2000s, several other cantons followed 
suit (BAK BASEL 2012), but variations on the theme exist in terms of both the constraints 
imposed and the sanctions to be applied in case of rule violation (Stalder and Röhrs 2005, 3; 
BAK BASEL 2012, 20–28). Building on a substantive body of prior evidence relating debt 
breaks to lower budget deficits (Feld and Kirchgässner 2000 and 2008; Schaltegger 2002; 
Krogstrup and Wälti 2008; Yerly 2013; Lüchinger and Schaltegger 2013; Chatagny 2013; see 
also Burret and Feld 2014 for an overview), we would expect that stricter debt break rules 
lead to lower cantonal expenditures. 
Finally, we include the share of voters for cantonal government parties into our empirical 
analysis to account for collusion. According to Lijphart (2012), consensual decision-making 
procedures encourage the magnitude of state intervention as minority interests have to be 
considered (Vatter and Freitag 2002, 58; Baskaran 2013). The more inclusive a policy-
making process, the more distributive policies are pursued for which the cost-bearers are less 
obvious (Braun 2000a, 13; Schniewind et al. 2009). So increased government spending might 
simply be a reflection of a broad governing coalition. 
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3 Research Design 
The research design chosen for this study is a sub-national comparison of Switzerland’s 26 
regional entities, the cantons, and the relations between cantonal (=central) and municipal 
(=local) governments. This kind of analysis, advised amongst other by Lijphart (1971, 689f.), 
King et al. (1994, 219) and Snyder (2001), assumes cantonal-local relations to be functionally 
equivalent to central-local relations. This has the advantage of strengthening some of the 
assumptions that have to be made (such as full information and resident mobility, see above) 
and holding other variables (such as the overall constitutional framework, defence spending 
or democratic stability) constant. Although the usefulness of this approach for fiscal matters 
has been proven by, amongst others, Wallis and Oates (1988), Schaltegger and Feld (2003) 
and Freitag and Vatter (2008), we discuss limitations to our research design in the concluding 
section. We next explain the operationalisation of our variables and then present our method. 
3.1 Operationalisation 
Our dependent variable is cantonal, local and total (= cantonal + local) public expenditure, 
measured on a per capita basis to facilitate comparability. However, per capita spending has 
increased in all the 26 cantons between 1990 and 2009, so instead of estimating absolute 
levels of annual per capita spending for each canton we subtract the mean of all cantons’ per 
capita spending for each year. In other words, we estimate the deviation from the mean 
cantonal per capita public spending to control for time-dependent error terms (cf. also 
Stadelmann-Steffen and Bühlmann 2008, 36–37).
2
 
Turning to our key independent variables, policy-decentralisation is measured using fiscal, 
personnel and administrative decentralisation within every Swiss canton, understood in turn 
as the extent to which local governments raise and administer public money (cf. also Rühli 
2012 and Fiechter 2010). However, full centralisation in one area (e.g. tax raising capacity) 
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13 
can easily be offset by decentralisation in another (e.g. personnel), which is to say that simply 
averaging their values would not render an accurate picture. In Goertz’s (2006, 115) terms, 
therefore, all three components are necessary and together they are jointly sufficient 
conditions for a canton to be decentralised in its policy-dimension. We therefore multiply 
general revenue decentralisation with administrative (the share of local from total public 
expenditures for administration only) and personnel decentralisation (the share of local staff 
and local staff salaries from their respective total numbers; cf. also Chhibber and Kollman 
2004, 234; Treisman 2002, 13).
3
 
Polity-decentralisation is defined by the extent of freedom guaranteed by cantonal 
constitutions (Giacometti 1941) and expert perceptions of the actual realisation thereof 
(Ladner et al. 2013). This takes into account possible discrepancies between “rules-in-form” 
and “rules-in-use” (Rothstein 1996; cf. also Rodden 2004, 492). In practice, we average the 
standardised values of the Giacometti-index (cantonal constitutions are either centralised, 
decentralised, or balanced; Giacometti 1941) and the results of the local government secretary 
surveys (Gemeindeschreiberbefragung, GSB) of 1994, 2005, and 2009 (cf. Ladner et al. 
2013).
4
 Averaging is possible because the two sub-dimensions are “substitutable” (Goertz 
2006, 108). 
Finally, politics-decentralisation captures the degree to which political decision-making is 
decentralised (i.e. local) rather than centralised (i.e. cantonal). There are seven indicators that 
are assessed here (cf. also Mueller 2011, 2014 and 2015): 
1. Cantonal political party organisation measures the local influence over candidate 
selection for cantonal parliamentary elections, from purely local discretion to cantonal 
delegate assemblies without any attachment to local politics; 
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2. Regionalism assess the degree to which regional assemblies and/or prefects exist in a 
canton, that is whether there are additional non-central loci situated between cantonal 
and local governments;
5
 
3. Territorial quotas take into account that electoral competition for the cantonal 
executive and/or legislative branches might be restricted using fixed quotas, such as 
those for the Bernese Jura region (guaranteed one out of five government seats); 
4. Electoral system organisation measures the territorial congruence between local 
governments and the electoral districts used for cantonal parliamentary elections; 
5. The direct representation of mayors in cantonal parliaments is assessed using the 
self-declarations of Members of Cantonal of Parliaments; 
6. The organisational strength of local government organisations captures the existence, 
cohesiveness and public presence of Local Government Associations (LGAs); and, 
finally, 
7. The existence of direct-democratic instruments for local governments measures the 
extent to which local governments qua municipalities can veto a cantonal bill and/or 
initiate cantonal constitutional change. 
All these indicators have in common that they – at least potentially – bring local interests to 
bear on central decision-making (cf. Page 1991, Rodden 2004, Stepan 2004, Tarrow 1977). 
To arrive at a single measure of politics-decentralisation, we rely on the results of a factor 
analysis of these seven indicators that searches for a single factor only (see Table A1, in the 
Annex). Finally, a reliability test of policy-, polity- and politics-decentralisation thus 
constructed reveals a sufficiently large commonality; therefore, to arrive at a single measure 
of overall decentralisation, we have calculated their arithmetic mean.6 The conceptual 
structure of decentralisation so defined is visualised in Figure 1, while summary statistics and 
empirical distribution of the mean values across the whole period are presented in the Annex. 
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--- Figure 1 --- 
To measure direct democracy, we use Stutzer’s (1999) index as updated by Schaub and 
Dlabac (2012). It is composed of the mean values of four dimensions, each coded from 1 = 
few direct-democratic rights to 6 = extended direct-democratic rights. For debt breaks, we 
rely on Feld and Kirchgässner’s (2008) ordinal variable on the strictness of cantonal debt 
breaks (0 = no debt break, 3 = strictest debt break). The strictest debt breaks tie expenditure 
directly to budget planning, foresee no exceptions, and provide for sanctions in case of non-
obedience. For each of these elements missing, strictness is downgraded to 2 or 1, while 0 
signifies the absence of a debt break altogether. For the years from 1990 to 2005, we use the 
coding by Lüchinger and Schaltegger (2013, 789–790 and 804) and Stalder and Röhrs (2005, 
28–30), for 2006–7 that by Chatagny (2013, 34) and for 2008–9 we have calculated the 
corresponding cantonal values ourselves based on information from the Année Politique 
Suisse (APS 2009). The resulting measure does not significantly correlate with any other 
indicator in our dataset. Finally, as an indicator of the size of the governing coalition we use 
the summed share of voters for parties in a cantonal government (cf. also Vatter and Freitag 
2002, 63; data source for our purposes: BFS 2015). 
As further control variables we shall use various socio-demographic, economic, cultural and 
structural indicators. To capture modernisation and market failure (Wagner 1958 [1883]; 
Verner 1979), we assess urbanisation and unemployment (cf. Schmidt 2000, 23; Kellermann 
2007, 48; Schaltegger 2001, 4). To measure those aspects of political culture potentially 
related to more demand for state intervention (Schmidt 2000, 30; Davis and Robinson 1999; 
Loughlin 2001), we assess the share of Catholics and German-speakers (Stadler 1996; 
Zürcher 2006; von der Weid, Bernhard and Jeanneret 2002, 63–65; Kriesi et al. 1996; Linder 
et al. 2008). To assess party competition and power resources (Schmidt 2000, 25–27; Schmidt 
1996), we measure the strength of left-wing parties and trade unions (cf. Hibbs 1977; Schmidt 
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1996; Wagschal 2005, 38), because to (re)distribute across social strata is politically desirable 
for them and their electorate or members. To assess mobility and demographic structure, we 
measure the share of residents above 65 years, the share of pupils in secondary education, the 
share of social benefit recipients and real median income (cf. also Funk and Gathmann 2011, 
1260). Finally, to control for the impact of changing maro-economic conditions (Schmidt 
1996, 167), we measure the performance of a canton using total federal corporate tax yield 
per canton, divided by that canton’s population, for each year of our analysis.
7
 
For unemployment and urbanisation, the share of Catholics and French-speakers, the strength 
of left-wing parties in cantonal parliaments (rather than in cantonal governments, since it is 
the overall strength of parties and not so much the number of government seats that the theory 
highlights), socio-demographics and federal tax yield we rely on data from the Federal 
Statistics Office (BFS 2015). To measure the strength of trade unions, we rely once more on 
data by Schaub and Dlabac (2012) (cf. also Vatter and Freitag 2002, 63) while income data is 
gathered from federal income tax statistics (Schaltegger and Gorgas 2011). Further details on 
each variable, its measurement, sources and summary statistics are listed in the Data Annex. 
3.2 Method 
To test which of the aforementioned explanations and specifications best matches the 
empirical reality of the Swiss cantons as 26 unit-independent cases, we estimate time-series 
cross-sectional (TSCS) models since our units are canton-years. We have checked that our 
time series is stationary using the Augmented-Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test. Models are 
estimated using the R-package “panelAR”. The package estimates linear models on panel 
data structures in the presence of AR(1)-type autocorrelation that are addressed via a two-step 
Prais-Winsten feasible generalized least squares procedure, allowing for common correlation 
coefficients across all panels (Kashin 2014), and panel-corrected standard errors that are 
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robust to both heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels. Such panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSEs) allow for more valid significance estimations.
 
Note that 
this method of estimating is rather conservative, hence if significant correlations are obtained 
these can be accepted with even more confidence than if another method had been chosen.
8
 
 
4 Findings 
Table 2 displays the results of our 9 TSCS models. For each dependent variable, we first 
include overall decentralisation and all controls (model 1); then the three dimensions of 
decentralisation and all controls (model 2); and finally, in model 3, the three dimensions of 
decentralisation plus all control variables with a generalised variance-inflation factor (GVIF) 
below 5 in any of the first two models.
9
 The different number of cases (487 instead of 520) is 
due to missing values for some variables (cf. Data Annex). Additionally, to avoid “collider 
bias”, that is collinearity between the independent variables – which is expected, since each 
forms one dimension of the same overarching concept – Table A5 provides for a step-by-step 
inclusion.
10
 
--- Table 2 --- 
We can see that overall decentralisation (the mean of the standardised values of polity-, 
policy- and politics-decentralisation) has an effect on all three types of spending. What is 
more, this effect is strongly significant: the more a cantonal political system is decentralised 
overall, the lower its total and central per capita expenditure, controlling for several other 
institutional, socio-economic, cultural and political variables. The effect of overall 
decentralisation on local expenditure, on the other hand, is significantly positive (see also 
Table A5). However, as we turn to decentralisation’s three dimensions, the picture becomes 
more varied. 
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For policy-decentralisation, a concept that most closely resembles the standard way 
decentralisation is measured to test the “Leviathan-hypothesis”, the hypothesised negative 
effect on both total (model T3) and central (model C3) expenditure can indeed be shown to 
exist. In other words, as the revenue and administrative capacity of local governments 
increases, central government spending decreases to such an extent that this also leads to an 
overall decrease in spending. This finding withstands the inclusion of various controls and is 
robust to both outlier analyses (not shown) and step-by-step inclusion to account for 
collinearity between the independent variables (Table A5). As expected, policy-
decentralisation also has a positive effect on local spending (model L3). 
That pattern is almost the same for polity-decentralisation, which measures the degree of 
constitutional and perceived local autonomy. Such a type of decentralisation equally 
decreases central and total spending, but does not seems to affect local spending: the 
correlation coefficient in model L3 is negative, yet fails to reach statistical significance (see 
also Table A5). In other words, a locally perceived and constitutionally codified ability to 
deviate from cantonal standards has the expected (H2a) negative effect on central spending – 
local freedom in this sense breeds both central and overall efficiency. 
The most interesting to highlight, however, are the results for politics-decentralisation, i.e. the 
extent to which political processes and actors are organised locally rather than centrally. Here, 
the effect is positive and significant for cantonal spending. What is more, the effect of 
politics-decentralisation on local spending is negative – hence, we are quite possibly 
witnessing a deliberate shift of the most costly policies (health, welfare, education) from the 
local to the cantonal level.
11
 A look at Table A5 confirms that in seven out of eight cases, 
politics-decentralisation has a positive effect on cantonal and a negative effect on local 
spending (but a significant effect on total spending only in one out of four cases, when 
included with polity-decentralisation). 
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What this means is that where mayors are directly represented in cantonal parliaments; where 
parties select their candidates for cantonal parliamentary elections at the very local level (in 
matching the constituencies); and where local governments qua local governments can make 
use of direct-democratic instruments to veto cantonal decisions; there the cantonal level can 
be brought to spend more rather than less. The interpretation of this finding would argue that 
this is so because local political actors are strategically interested in shifting costs “upwards”, 
to the cantonal level, so that their own polities appear to be in better fiscal shape than if they 
had to spend the money from their own budgets – and raise their own, local taxes 
correspondingly (Horber-Papazian and Soguel 1996). The result is a sort of state capture from 
below. 
--- Table 3 --- 
In assessing the relative impact of each of the three dimensions, we can see from Table 3 that 
in each column overall decentralisation has the biggest effect; that policy-decentralisation 
clearly tops the other two as regards central and local spending; and that politics-
decentralisation is almost as important as policy-decentralisation with regards to cantonal 
spending – but in the opposite direction, that is leading to more rather than less spending. Of 
the remaining significant effects, the strongest impact is that by polity-decentralisation on 
total spending and by politics-decentralisation on local spending, both in a negative direction. 
Turning to our control variables, the debt break has a strong curbing effect on all three types 
of spending, which is in line with previous findings (e.g. Vatter & Freitag 2007, 365). 
Unemployment, urbanisation, and federal corporate tax yield (our measure of economic 
performance) all have positive and significant effects on both central and total spending.
12
 
Whether a canton has a catholic majority also matters for total spending, seemingly 
disconfirming Catholic-inspired statism (cf. Davis and Robinson 1999). Local spending, in 
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turn, seems to be positively driven by consensual politics (Vatter 2014) and negatively by the 
age structure. Finally, all three types of spending are also driven by language, which however 
had to be exluded from models 3 because of collinearity problems. Only inconsistent effects 
can be discerned as regards education, left-wing parties, and the strength of trade unions. 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
What explains why some governments spend more than others? This study has centred on 
decentralisation as a key institutional variable to understand why this is the case. Overall, we 
have been able to confirm the “Leviathan hypothesis” with new, original data at the Swiss 
sub-national level: where there is overall decentralisation, there is less government. And this 
despite controlling for a number of other institutionalist as well as socio-economic, cultural 
and partisan factors. The commonly hypothesised effects of unemployment, urbanisation, 
income, demographics, political culture and direct democracy have also more or less been 
found in our data on 20 years of cantonal, local and total public expenditure. 
However, that overall picture becomes more complex – and interesting – once we look at 
different types of decentralisation. The availability and careful combination of fine-grained 
fiscal, administrative, constitutional, electoral, direct-democratic, parliamentary, party-
politics and survey data has enabled us to conceptualise and measure three different types of 
decentralisation. For each dimension, we hypothesised and found different effects: policy-
decentralisation, that is the extent to which revenues and administrative staff are local rather 
than central, has the clearest negative effect on central and total public spending while 
boosting local spending. Polity-decentralisation, which pertains to constitutional freedom and 
local perceptions thereof, also reduces the size of the central and total state sector. However, 
for politics-decentralisation, which captures the strength of local political influence at central 
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level, we have shown a positive relation to exist with central expenditure and a negative 
effect on local spending. 
The significance of these findings beyond the Swiss case is that decentralisation does not 
equal decentralisation. If the availability of tax-raising and administrative power is referred to 
(policy-decentralisation), a straightforward competition logic was shown to happen. The 
ensuing “race to the bottom” means that public services are provided at a level deemed 
optimal by both decision-makers and consumers alike, since ideally these two overlap. If 
local autonomy refers to constitutionally guaranteed self-rule (polity-decentralisation), then 
that link is less straightforward, especially as regards local spending. A possible reason being 
that the same degree of local autonomy can be used for different purposes depending on 
dynamics taking place within the local entities. Finally, if by decentralisation we mean 
political aspects such as the extent to which political actors (parties, mayors) and processes 
(elections, direct democracy) function locally rather than centrally, more power at the lower 
level can mean more burdens placed on the higher level. In fact, the lower institutional 
echelons may try to delegate the provision of expensive and/or new public services to higher 
levels whilst maintaining all of their decisional capacities (Horber-Papazian and Soguel 
1996). 
This last phenomenon is what we refer to as state capture from below. Its reasoning draws 
partly on Greve’s (2012) notion of “cartel federalism” and the observation that were the US 
states to draw up the federal constitution and not individual citizens, they would try “not to 
discipline Leviathan but to empower government” (p. 178). As “revenue maximizers” (ibid., 
189), sub-national governments are interested in federal transfers as much as in broadening 
their own sources of income. Consistent with this is the observation that the Swiss 
Association of Cities has repeatedly called for a revision to the federal equalisation scheme 
introduced in 2008 to channel more funds to the urban regions as opposed to the 
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countryside.
13
 What is more, to better lobby for their financial interests at both cantonal and 
national levels, cities even created a special Conference of Urban Finance Ministers, in 
August 2014.
14
 But local governments also function as a break to further expenditure, as 
when 19 municipalities in Canton Grisons challenged a reform of the intra-cantonal 
equalisation scheme that, since it eventually passed, increased central spending – as well as 
their own contributions.
15
 
For further research into both territorial politics and public finance, this signifies, firstly, that 
a more nuanced understanding (and measurement) of decentralisation is worth pursuing, since 
not all types of decentralisation lead to the same outcome. Overcoming the divide between 
federalism and decentralisation studies is also necessary if all three dimensions of collective 
decision making – policy, polity, and politics – are to be included: there is nothing, neither at 
the conceptual nor theoretical level, that would justify treating local-cantonal relations as 
prima facie different from regional-national or local-national relations. Nevertheless, while it 
is quite plausible to think that well organised local or regional actors are able to block policy 
changes that burden them with excessive costs but are quite happy to support policies paid for 
by the central state alone, this finding would of course have to be verified using more 
qualitative data, such as structured-focused comparisons or process tracing, and for other 
contexts. 
A second point of reflection concerns possible interaction effects, which we have alluded to 
above. In fact, exercising influence at the central level may require a certain minimum degree 
of self-rule for actors to be taken seriously. In the same vein, local discretion over the level of 
public service delivery remains symbolic if most of the revenue stems from earmarked 
transfers. These mutual conditioning effects are somehow controlled for by our sub-national 
research design: all Swiss municipalities can levy at least some taxes autonomously; all have 
some basic legal protection (Art. 50.1 of the Federal Constitution); and almost everywhere do 
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we find local party sections, mayors in cantonal parliaments, and local government 
associations. Nevertheless, future studies ought to theorise and test possible interaction effects 
more explicitly. 
Hence, while Switzerland may be unique in the scope of autonomy accorded to both cantonal 
and local polities and its extremely non-centralised politics, this study has profited from this 
fact by comparing the 26 cantons as unit-independent political systems. And despite these 
limitations, the above cited evidence on Latin America, Canada, the US and Germany is 
broadly consistent with our conclusions that fiscal decentralisation hampers general 
government growth while political decentralisation favours increased central spending. We 
would expect these conclusions to apply to other federal political systems, too. There are, on 
the one hand, many regions within federal systems that similarly accord their local 
governments autonomy and influence over public policy. The German Länder, for example, 
are equally likely to fall prey to capture from below as are the Swiss cantons. On the other 
hand, the mentioned “overfishing of the pool” (Rodden 2006, 6) might also travel to the 
national and even European level, as when the Canadian provinces bargain with Ottawa 
(Simeon 1972) or when regions open embassies in Brussels (Callanan & Tatham 2014) to 
influence “Who Gets What from Whom” (Schneider 2006). It is, however, unlikely that local 
governments or even regions without any constitutionally protected autonomy and/or a 
minimum level of fiscal autonomy are able to systematically exercise meaningful influence at 
higher levels. 
A further avenue for future research might also be to distinguish between the effects for 
spatial, non-spatial, identity and welfare policies (Braun 2000b; Wälti and Bullinger 2000), 
rather than overall spending. Here, one could assume the absence of territorial effects for non-
spatial polices, unless coupled with the defence of territorially concentrated minorities, and 
take into account the ideological orientation and socio-economic attributes of lower-level 
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entities themselves. Also, the effects of politics-decentralisation should be strongest for 
distributive policies from which all lower-entities eventually profit. Here again, a distinction 
of types of decentralisation might prove useful, for once given (symbolic?) institutional 
autonomy, some lower-level entities might be quite happy to renounce on fiscal capacity, 
while others might be more pressed for being able to raise money at the expense of 
constitutional guarantees, and a third group (e.g. cities) might be most inclined towards 
shifting costs upwards, regardless of both the politics of symbols and own-source income. 
To conclude, the wider implication of our study is that the balance between self-rule and 
shared rule has implications also for the size of the overall political system. Decentralisation, 
like many social science concepts, contains multiple dimensions. What our study has found is 
that political influence and local autonomy (both legal and fiscal) may have contradictory 
effects, with the former boosting but the latter reducing government spending. 
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Endnotes 
1
 A further difficulty is terminological (Rodden 2006, 24), with decentralisation either 
referring to a sub-dimension of federalism (e.g. Watts 2008) or, alternatively, its synonym 
(e.g. Riker 1964). While it would probably be more correct to speak of “non-centralisation” 
(Elazar 1987, 34), that term is not widely used. Hence, because the literature on fiscal 
federalism essentially deals with expenditure and revenue decentralisation (e.g. Rodden 
2003a, 697), we will use this term even when referring to the political and institutional 
dimensions of the vertical division of power that others have labelled “cartel federalism” 
(Greve 2012, 4) or “shared rule” (Elazar 1987; Hooghe et al. 2010). 
2
 We also specified multilevel models with year-fixed effects that do not demean the 
dependent variable in this way, which did not substantially alter our results (see also endnote 
8). 
3
 Data are from BADAC (2012). Cronbach’s alpha for fiscal, personnel and administrative 
decentralisation is .813; if run with the four indicators individually, it is .880 (both times N = 
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26). We omit expenditure decentralisation to avoid endogeneity problems with our dependent 
variable, but our results do not change if this indicator is included. 
4
 In these surveys, the secretaries of local governments, considered experts on everything 
local, were asked to rate the extent of local autonomy from 1 (no autonomy) to 10 (very high 
autonomy). N (GSB1994) = 1,549; N (GSB2005) = 2,003; N (GSB2009) = 1,317 (cf. also Data 
Annex). Cronbach’s alpha for the four measures, “Giacometti Index”, “GSB1994”, “GSB2005” 
and “GSB2009”, is a high .885 (N = 26). 
5
 Although it may seem counter-intuitive at first sight to code the presence of prefects as an 
instance of decentralisation, in the Swiss context this makes sense since in many cantons 
prefects are elected locally, in their districts, and thus also function as bottom-up channels for 
influence. 
6
 Cronbach’s alpha = .682 (three items), see also Table A2. Alternatively, we have run a 
factor analysis, where it was specified that only one component should be extracted, but the 
results of all subsequent analysis do not change if these factor scores are used in place of the 
much more intuitive and transparent aggregate. 
7
 Unfortunaley, cantonal GDP data are only available from 2008 onwards, and for reasons of 
tax autonomy, cantonal income tax yield is not directly comparable, especially not if we want 
to capture economic conditions. Hence, in reyling on federal tax yield, we assess the 
economic potential of a canton, thus loosely applying the official method used for fiscal 
equalisation across Switzerland since 2008. Data are available for legal entities and natural 
persons separately. However, for natural persons some data are missing for some cantons in 
some years. This is why rely on the data for legal entities. However, our results do not change 
if we use the tax yield from natural persons instead.  
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8
 Alternatively, we have calculated non-nested multilevel models (cf. Gelman and Hill 2007, 
244) and multilevel analyses with year-fixed effects. All of those broadly confirm our 
findings (detailed results available on request). 
9
 The Variance-Inflation Factor (VIF), or Generalised Variance-Inflation Factor (GVIF) in the 
presence of variables with more than one degree of freedom (the debt-break, in our case), 
measures the extent to which the impact of one variable (more particularly, the variance of its 
coefficient) is inflated because of multicollinearity. 
10
 We thank the anonymous reviewer of the Journal of Public Policy for this advice. 
11
 This central finding is robust to the use of other models (see endnote 8) and to using 
absolute rather than mean-corrected values of spending (see endnote 2). 
12
 In a broader sense, our empirical results thus seem to be in line with Wasserfallen’s (2014) 
findings that Swiss cantons compete more strongly with their competitors the closer a canton 
is located to an urban region with a comprehensive set of public goods on offer. 
13
 Cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 19 August 2010, p. 11, and of 25 January 2011, p. 11, as well 
as, most recently, the press release of the Association of Swiss Cities of 27 June 2014, at 
http://staedteverband.ch/cmsfiles/140627_mm_nfa-vn.pdf [12.5.2015].  
14
 Cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 23 August 2014, p. 12, and Art. 2(1) of the Conference’s 
bylaws at http://ksfd.ch/cmsfiles/statuten_ksfd_def.pdf [12.5.2015]. 
15
 Cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 23 September 2014, p. 13, and of 29 September 2014, p. 9. A 
similar use of direct-democratic means by local governments can be observed in Zurich (2010 
and 2015) and Solothurn (2004 and 2014), for example (cf. also Mueller 2014). 
  
Page 34 of 46
ScholarOne, 375 Greenbrier Drive, Charlottesville, VA, 22901
Journal of Public Policy Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
35 
Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Conceptual structure of cantonal decentralisation 
 
Table 1: Expected impact of decentralisation on spending 
Decentralisation 
Government size 
Cantonal spending Local spending Total spending 
Policy (–) (+) – [H1] 
Polity – [H2a] + [H2b] ? 
Politics + [H3b] ? – [H3a] 
Note: “+” = positive, “–“ = negative influence expected; secondary hypotheses in brackets; 
“?” = no relationship specified ex ante. 
Concept Dimensions Sub-dimensions Indicators
Cantonal 
Decentralisation
Policy-
Decentralisation
fiscal
decentralisation
% of local revenue from total public revenue    
personnel 
decentralisation
% of local staff from total public staff
% of local staff salaries from total public salaries
administrative decentralisation % of local admin expenditures from total admin 
expenditures (1997-2005)
Polity-
Decentralisation
Giacometti-Index
perceived local autonomy
local secretary survey of 1994
local secretary survey of 2005
local secretary survey of 2009 
Politics-
Decentralisation
intra-cant. regionalism prefects and assembies
territorial quotas leg. and ex. elections
party decentralisation candidate selection
parl. constituencies cant. parl. elections
cumul-des-mandats mayors in cant. parl.
LGA strength org. depth and width
communal shared rule local initiative & veto
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Table 2: Results of TSCS models 
  DV1: Cantonal spending, 1990–2009 DV2: Local spending, 1990–2009 DV2: Total spending, 1990–2009 
 Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 Model L1 Model L2 Model L3 Model T1 Model T2 Model T3 
Intercept 
-2634.95 -853.66 -2490.95 2651.70*** 1604.52** 386.95 -616.82 1005.48 -2132.76 
-2734.4 -2112.14 -1726.89 -715.65 -653.74 -583.22 -2699.49 -2287.13 -1971.1 
Decentralisation 
-2283.73*** 
    
950.61*** 
    
-1347.56*** 
    
-316.43 -144.13 -323.34 
Policy-dimension   
-1445.62*** -1402.93*** 
  
692.08*** 640.47*** 
  
-752.33*** -831.86*** 
-181.35 -170.83 -73.47 -67.43 -163.16 -157.55 
Polity-dimension   
-749.46*** -597.31** 
  
49.97 -38.59 
  
-704.57** -610.67*** 
-287.45 -238.75 -84.23 -72.93 -296.07 -225.77 
Politics-
dimension 
  
745.49*** 576.83*** 
  
42.22 -218.22*** 
  
778.95*** 279.63 
-212.2 -221.04 -114.41 -66.92 -255.11 -200.08 
Control variables 
Direct democracy 
71.55 -456.51** 
  
-480.30*** -397.57*** 
  
-309.95 -822.37*** 
  
-231.13 -197.84 -117.81 -116.77 -232.97 -256.06 
Weak debt breakt-
1  
136.91 193.32 175.97 205.02* 290.23** 341.91*** 338.48 413.96 541.25** 
-185.41 -209.06 -200.97 -118.43 -122.17 -127.3 -240.37 -262.63 -274.74 
Moderate debt 
breakt-1 
-210.98 -153.04 -128.85 -39.84 -105.5 -188.05** -341.81 -247.32 -379.12* 
-235.29 -193.27 -189.21 -99.97 -87.97 -83.14 -226.59 -203.32 -199.97 
Strong debt 
breakt-1 
-68.71 -798.49** -677.75** -569.43*** -454.98*** -265.83* -664.11* -1174.17*** -1019.00*** 
-258.19 -352.91 -319.56 -176.04 -147.01 -140.65 -344.45 -371.8 -317.31 
Government 
coalition 
-0.02 -4.34 -4.04 5.64** 7.69*** 7.32*** 5.18 2.99 3.06 
-5.19 -5.78 -5.49 -2.59 -2.64 -2.65 -5.56 -5.85 -5.79 
Urbanisation 
59.26*** 72.69*** 79.1*** -2.66 -7.38*** 
  
56.57*** 66.92*** 71.40*** 
-20.88 -15.23 -14.94 -3.48 -2.86 -19.98 -16.34 -14.27 
Unemployment 32.66* 37.87** 34.81** 0.58 -1.96 1.61 33.07* 36.47** 37.32** 
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-18.06 -15.86 -15.37 -6.76 -6.42 -6.87 -17.41 -16.51 -16.57 
Catholic canton 
(dummy) 
508.13 63.75 
  
-588.48*** -335.66*** -110.58 -61.7 -285.71 -385.46* 
-442.96 -295.9 -150.91 -123.15 -109.08 -429.32 -325.36 -206.81 
German-speaking 
(dummy) 
1829.28*** 1507.79*** 
  
-552.08** -202.18 
  
1087.06 1289.83* 
  
-691 -559.52 -273.35 -253.91 -666.78 -665.01 
Left-wing parties 
-3.08 -9.76 
  
4.19 5.85 2.66 -0.43 -3.04 
  
-17.38 -17.58 -5.38 -5.07 -5.21 -17.62 -17.57 
Trade unions 
35.58* 27.22 11.69 0.96 4.35 7.37 33.94 30.84 19.1 
-20.82 -18.41 -18.04 -8.62 -7.16 -7.15 -21.73 -20.16 -18.48 
Age 
186.42** 70.28 89.72 -70.57** -29.31 -51.86** 127.15 45.91 31.28 
-80.92 -58.41 -60.38 -27.83 -21.59 -24.5 -86.55 -72.75 -74.86 
Education 
-1003.8*** -444.57* -283.15 172.94* 38.31 -74.28 -793.08** -479.45* -232.78 
-277.65 -258.72 -251.46 -100.67 -84.03 -75.67 -280.96 -267.21 -253.31 
Social benefits 
212.86 169.23 
  
-150.84* -112.89* 
  
84.68 43.79 
  
-177.1 -143.9 -79.05 -67.18 -163.62 -140.22 
Median income 
-37.96* -4.06 -0.3 12.85 8.28 -0.23 -23.08 -0.45 2.99 
-19.83 -20.73 -18.91 -8.76 -7.91 -7.91 -21.44 -22.35 -20.76 
Federal Tax Yield 
0.12* 0.12* 0.12* 0 0.01 0.01 0.13* 0.12* 0.14* 
-0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
R2 0.27 0.46 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.33 0.21 0.31 0.32 
Rho 0.91 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.82 0.85 0.9 0.86 0.84 
No. of 
observations 
487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 
Note: non-standardised regression coefficients, standard errors in brackets. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01. For GVIF-values, see Table A6.  
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Table 3: Relative impact of decentralisation on spending 
Decentralisation 
Government size 
Cantonal spending Local spending Total spending 
Overall decentralisation -0.515*** 0.582*** -0.347*** 
Policy -0.428*** 0.531*** -0.290*** 
Polity -0.169** -0.030 -0.197*** 
Politics 0.167*** -0.172*** 0.092 
Note: Entries are the standardized Beta-coefficients from models 1 (for overall 
decentralisation) and 3 (for its three dimensions) of Table 2. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Data Annex 
Table A1: Two factor analyses for politics-decentralisation 
Measure 
Three-Components 
Solution 
Single-
Component 
Solution 1 2 3 
LG constituencies 0.794 0.293 -0.281 0.832 
Regionalism 0.727 -0.081 0.195 0.371 
Strength of LGAs -0.640 -0.085 0.574 -0.709 
Direct democracy -0.116 0.818 -0.069 0.457 
Mayor MCPs 0.159 0.750 -0.204 0.654 
Party decentralisation 0.493 0.619 0.120 0.677 
Territorial quotas 0.054 -0.107 0.884 -0.366 
 
Note: Principal component analysis, rotation using the Varimax Kaiser Normalisation method 
(converged in five iterations). Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity: X2 = 39.793 (p < .01). 
 
Table A2: Factor analysis for overall decentralisation 
Indicators 
Components 
1 2 3 
fiscal decentralisation (2005/2008) -.085 .936 -.092 
personnel decentralisation (2008) .407 .792 .079 
administrative decentralisation (1997–2003) -.213 .863 .012 
Giacometti-index .747 .298 .353 
perceived local autonomy (1994, 2005, and 2009) .885 .173 -.069 
regionalism index (2011) .478 .003 -.102 
types of territorial quotas (2011) -.080 .219 -.551 
party decentralisation (2011) .507 .614 .292 
constituency index .824 -.084 .274 
Mayor MCPs (2011) .249 .168 .696 
strength of LG Associations (2011) -.768 .331 -.258 
direct-democratic decentralisation (2011) -.095 .127 .827 
 
Note: Principal component analysis, rotation using the Varimax Kaiser Normalisation method 
(converged in four iterations). Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity: X2 = 162.665 (p < .01) 
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Table A3: Variable description 
Variable Operationalisation Data source 
Expenditure Own calculations based on absolute capital expenditures divided by the 
permanent resident population, less the annual mean of all cantons that year. 
Data for cantonal, local and total (=cantonal + local) expenditure. 
Federal Finance 
Administration and Federal 
Office for Statistics  
Decentralisation Own calculations for the Policy-, Polity- and Politics-dimension: 
Policy-Dimension: Local governments’ share of the public money raised and 
administered within a canton (on annual basis).  
Polity-Dimension: Index of Giacometti (1941, for 1990 to 2009) and local 
government secretary survey results (Gemeindeschreiberbefragung, GSB) of 
1994 (for 1990 to 1999), 2005 (for 2000 to 2005) and 2009 (for 2006 to 2009).  
Politics-Dimension: Index including cantonal political party organisation, 
regionalism, territorial quotas, electoral system organisation, direct 
representation of mayors in cantonal parliaments, the organisational strength of 
local government organisations, and the existence of direct-democratic 
instruments for local governments (cf. Mueller 2011, 2014, and 2015). 
For all dimensions we calculated z-standardized values. The mean of those 
three values equals the overall value for the variable “Decentralisation”. 
BADAC (2012), Giacometti 
(1941), GSB (1994, 2005 and 
2009), cantonal party statutes, 
cantonal constitutions and 
electoral laws, cantonal 
parliamentary websites, and 
cantonal local government 
association websites. 
Direct democracy Index of Stutzer (1999) with mean values from 1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2009 
for the following four dimensions: the right to launch a legislative initiative, the 
right to launch a constitutional initiative, the right to veto a legislative initiative, 
and the right to veto a financial decision. Scale: 1 = few direct-democratic 
rights, 6 = extended direct-democratic rights. The overall index equals the mean 
of the values for the four dimensions. 
Schaub and Dlabac (2012)  
Debt break Index of Feld and Kirchgässner (2008). Scale: 0 = no debt break, 1 = weak debt 
break, 2 = moderate debt break, 3 = strong debt break. 
Lüchinger and Schaltegger 
(2013: 789-790; 804); 
Chatagny (2013: 34); Stalder 
and Röhrs (2005: 28-30). 
Government 
coalition 
Own calculations based on the vote share of the parties in government. For 
cantons Uri, Graubünden and Appenzell-Ausserrhoden, we rely on the 
percentage of seats in parliament, as data to the vote share are unavailable. 
Appenzell-Innerrhoden is excluded because it has too peculiar a system.  
Federal Office for Statistics / 
Année Politique Suisse, 
several years. 
Urbanisation Percentage of urban population Federal Office for Statistics 
Unemployment Unemployment rate State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs and Federal Office for 
Statistics 
Catholic Indicates whether canton has 1 = majority that is Catholic, 0 otherwise Federal Office for Statistics 
German-speaking  Indicates whether canton has 1 = majority that is German-speaking, 0 otherwise Federal Office for Statistics 
Left-wing parties Own calculations based on the share of seats in the cantonal parliament of the 
following parties: Social-Democratic Party, Green party, Labour Party 
[formerly Communist Party], other small left parties. No data are available for 
the canton of Appenzell-Innerrhoden from 1990 to 2009 and for the canton of 
Appenzell-Ausserrhoden from 1999 to 2002.  
Federal Office for Statistics / 
Année Politique Suisse, 
several years. 
Trade unions Share of members of trade unions of the working population.  Schaub and Dlabac (2012) 
Age Percentage of residents who are above 65 years old Federal Office for Statistics 
Education Share of people in secondary education; data are available for the time period 
from 1999 to 2009, for the other years mean values were used. No data are 
Federal Office for Statistics 
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available for the canton of Appenzell-Innerrhoden from 1990 to 2009. 
Social benefits Share of people receiving social benefits; data are available for the time period 
from 2005 to 2009, for the other years mean values were used. 
Federal Office for Statistics 
Median income Median income of cantonal residents (real) Schaltegger & Gorgas (2011) 
Federal Tax Yield Total annual tax yield from federal corporate taxation by canton, divided by a 
canton’s permanent resident population. 
Federal Office for Statistics 
 
Table A4: Summary Statistics 
Variable Min. Max. Mean SD 
Cantonal per capita expenditure (mean-corrected) -4123 17290 0 3074.38 
Local per capita expenditure (mean-corrected) -3456 3285 0 1168.74 
Total per capita expenditure (mean-corrected) -4073 13830 0 2746.8 
Overall Decentralisation -1.83 1.24 0 0.71 
Policy-Dimension -1.81 2.44 0 0.98 
Polity-Dimension -1.96 1.57 0 0.88 
Politics-Dimension -1.88 2.35 0 0.98 
Direct democracy 1.74 5.76 4.26 1.17 
Debt break 0 3 0.57 1 
Government coalition 50.6 100 79.97 10.12 
Urbanisation 0 89.27 24.49 19.49 
Unemployment 0.03 7.81 2.79 1.7 
Catholic canton (dummy) 0 1 0.42 0.49 
German-speaking (dummy) 0 1 0.73 0.44 
Left-wing parties 6.15 53.08 26.07 11.6 
Trade unions 0.83 34.55 9.2 6.35 
Age 11.57 22.72 16.22 2.09 
Education 1.38 4.26 2.69 0.63 
Social benefits 0.8 7.1 2.51 1.43 
Median income 43.2 64.67 52.95 4.11 
Federal Tax Yield 85.65 10430 827.5 1254.77 
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Table A5: Results of step-by-step TSCS models 
Independent variable(s) 
Dependent variable 
Cantonal spending Local spending Total spending 
Overall Decentralisation  negative positive negative 
Policy-Decentralisation Policy (-) Policy (+) Policy (-) 
Polity-Decentralisation Polity (-) n.s. Polity (-) 
Politics-Decentralisation Politics (+) Politics (-) n.s. 
Policy- + Polity-Dec. Policy (-), Polity (-) Policy (+), Polity (-) Policy (-), Polity (-) 
Policy- + Politics-Dec. Policy (-) Policy (+), Politics (-) Policy (-) 
Polity- + Politics-Dec. Polity (-), Politics (+) Politics (-) Polity (-), Politics (+) 
Policy- + Polity- + 
Politics-Decentralisation 
Policy (-), Polity (-), 
Politics (+) 
Policy (+), Politics (-) Policy (-), Polity (-) 
Note: Each cell represents one model to explain mean-corercted public spending between 
1990 and 2009, all of which were estimated using th  same procedure as for models 3 in 
Table 2, i.e. incl. all control variables with GVIF < 5. All effects are significant, with “-“ = 
negative, “+” = positive effect (at least p<.1), otherwise omitt d or “n.s.” (= not significant). 
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Table A6: Results of TSCS models incl. GVIF-values 
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Figure A1: Empirical Distribution of Cantonal Decentralisation Dimensions 
 
Note: Mean values over the entire period are used for the sake of simplicity. 
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Model C1 GVIF Model C2 GVIF Model C3 GVIF Model L1 GVIF Model L2 GVIF Model L3 GVIF Model T1 GVIF Model T2 GVIF Model T3 GVIF
-2634.95 -853.66 -2490.95 2651.70*** 1604.52** 386.95 -616.82 1005.48 -2132.76
-2734.4 -2112.14 -1726.89 -715.65 -653.74 -583.22 -2699.49 -2287.13 -1971.1
-2283.73*** 950.61*** -1347.56***
-316.43 -144.13 -323.34
-1445.62*** -1402.93*** 692.08*** 640.47*** -752.33*** -831.86***
-181.35 -170.83 -73.47 -67.43 -163.16 -157.55
-749.46*** -597.31** 49.97 -38.59 -704.57** -610.67***
-287.45 -238.75 -84.23 -72.93 -296.07 -225.77
745.49*** 576.83*** 42.22 -218.22*** 778.95*** 279.63
-212.2 -221.04 -114.41 -66.92 -255.11 -200.08
71.55 -456.51** -480.30*** -397.57*** -309.95 -822.37***
-231.13 -197.84 -117.81 -116.77 -232.97 -256.06
136.91 193.32 175.97 205.02* 290.23** 341.91*** 338.48 413.96 541.25**
-185.41 -209.06 -200.97 -118.43 -122.17 -127.3 -240.37 -262.63 -274.74
-210.98 -153.04 -128.85 -39.84 -105.5 -188.05** -341.81 -247.32 -379.12*
-235.29 -193.27 -189.21 -99.97 -87.97 -83.14 -226.59 -203.32 -199.97
-68.71 -798.49** -677.75** -569.43*** -454.98*** -265.83* -664.11* -1174.17*** -1019.00***
-258.19 -352.91 -319.56 -176.04 -147.01 -140.65 -344.45 -371.8 -317.31
-0.02 -4.34 -4.04 5.64** 7.69*** 7.32*** 5.18 2.99 3.06
-5.19 -5.78 -5.49 -2.59 -2.64 -2.65 -5.56 -5.85 -5.79
59.26*** 72.69*** 79.1*** -2.66 -7.38*** 56.57*** 66.92*** 71.40***
-20.88 -15.23 -14.94 -3.48 -2.86 -19.98 -16.34 -14.27
32.66* 37.87** 34.81** 0.58 -1.96 1.61 33.07* 36.47** 37.32**
-18.06 -15.86 -15.37 -6.76 -6.42 -6.87 -17.41 -16.51 -16.57
508.13 63.75 -588.48*** -335.66*** -110.58 -61.7 -285.71 -385.46*
-442.96 -295.9 -150.91 -123.15 -109.08 -429.32 -325.36 -206.81
1829.28*** 1507.79*** -552.08** -202.18 1087.06 1289.83*
-691 -559.52 -273.35 -253.91 -666.78 -665.01
-3.08 -9.76 4.19 5.85 2.66 -0.43 -3.04
-17.38 -17.58 -5.38 -5.07 -5.21 -17.62 -17.57
35.58* 27.22 11.69 0.96 4.35 7.37 33.94 30.84 19.1
-20.82 -18.41 -18.04 -8.62 -7.16 -7.15 -21.73 -20.16 -18.48
186.42** 70.28 89.72 -70.57** -29.31 -51.86** 127.15 45.91 31.28
-80.92 -58.41 -60.38 -27.83 -21.59 -24.5 -86.55 -72.75 -74.86
-1003.8*** -444.57* -283.15 172.94* 38.31 -74.28 -793.08** -479.45* -232.78
-277.65 -258.72 -251.46 -100.67 -84.03 -75.67 -280.96 -267.21 -253.31
212.86 169.23 -150.84* -112.89* 84.68 43.79
-177.1 -143.9 -79.05 -67.18 -163.62 -140.22
-37.96* -4.06 -0.3 12.85 8.28 -0.23 -23.08 -0.45 2.99
-19.83 -20.73 -18.91 -8.76 -7.91 -7.91 -21.44 -22.35 -20.76
0.12* 0.12* 0.12* 0 0.01 0.01 0.13* 0.12* 0.14*
-0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
R 2 0.27 0.46 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.33 0.21 0.31 0.32
Rho 0.91 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.82 0.85 0.9 0.86 0.84
No. of observations 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487
Note: non-standardised regression coefficients, standard errors in brackets. GVIF = Generalised Variance-Inflation Factors. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
3.17
Control variables
DV1: Cantonal spending, 1990–2009 DV2: Local spending, 1990–2009 DV2: Total spending, 1990–2009
1.09
3.19
1.36
3.14
5.42
3.21
1.2
1.93
3.28
1.89
1.69
2.04
1.26
2.68
2.14
2.31
4.55
1.15
4
1.4
8.94
1.19
1.85
1.97
1.84
5.22
1.1
2.86
1.23
1.72
1.82
1.83
1.89
2.56 3.58
3.47
3.22
2.83
4.07
3.43
1.04
3.19
1.26
1.26
3
2.28
2.56
4.41
1.49
8.56
4.93
1.23
1.59
1.92
1.64
2.79
1.21
2.27 3.72
3.99 5.42
6.67 10.29
3.51 6.51
4.57 10.31
2.13 4.07
8.96 5.18
4.21
1.63 1.27
1.19 1.32 1.151.15
1.55
2.24 4.09 1.66
4.03 7.18
3.17
1.99 1.4
1.62 2.7 1.651.45
1.74
5.98 12.02
1.87 2.66
1.14 1.09
2.16 3.09 1.68
1.19 1.3 1.21
2.83 6.06
8.6 1.82
6.31 14.58
3.97
Median income
Federal Tax Yield
Education 2.19 4.88
Social benefits 4.08 6.81
Trade unions
Age
German-speaking 
(dummy) 4.91 8.88
Left-wing parties 3.36 8.39
Unemployment 1.11 1.19
Catholic canton 
(dummy) 4.8 5.46
Strong debt breakt-1
Government coalition
Urbanisation
Direct democracy 3.81 6.97
Weak debt breakt-1 
2.06 4.93Moderate debt breakt-1
Politics-dimension 6.22 4.08
Policy-dimension
Polity-dimension
Intercept
Decentralisation 3.5
1.33
1.42
1.11
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